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CRIMINAL LAW
IS THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DEAD?
CRAIG M. BRADLEY*
In three recent decisions, Hudson v. Michigan, Herring v. United
States, and last Term’s Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court has
indicated a desire to severely restrict the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule. A majority of the Justices wants to limit its application to cases where
the police have violated the Fourth Amendment purposely, knowingly, or
recklessly, but not where they have engaged in “simple, isolated
negligence” or where negligence is “attenuated” from the discovery of the
evidence. They have further suggested that evidence should not be excluded
where the police have behaved as reasonable policemen, using the
approach from United States v. Leon.
The Court’s new approach, based on the culpability of the police, is
subjective, yet the Court insists that it does not probe the police’s mind.
The new approach seems to reject negligence as the basis of exclusion, yet
Leon is a negligence-based approach. The new approach assumes that
“reckless” behavior can be deterred more readily than negligent behavior,
but that is not obvious.
This Article reviews Hudson, Herring, and Davis, as well as the court
of appeals cases that have applied Herring. It suggests that the Supreme
Court has not eliminated the exclusionary rule and argues that the rule
should still be applied in cases of “substantial” as opposed to “simple
isolated” negligence—that is, when negligence has substantially interfered
with a suspect’s privacy rights, such as through an illegal arrest or an
illegal search of his car or house. It notes that none of the three cases
decided by the Court involved such a substantial intrusion. It concludes,
through a careful reading of the three cases, as well as examination of
successful defense appeals in the courts of appeals, that the exclusionary
*
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rule, though limited, is neither dead nor unacceptably constrained.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Herring v. United States,1 the Supreme Court cast serious doubt on
the continued existence of the exclusionary rule when it issued a narrow
holding stating that exclusion is inappropriate when police misconduct is
“the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest.”2 The Court
went on to suggest that evidence should be excluded only when it is
obtained through “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in
some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.”3 In Herring, the
police relied on another county’s erroneous report that an arrest warrant was
in effect for the defendant, but the Court applied its new standard and
refused to exclude evidence found during his subsequent arrest.4
In most cases, the police mistake will not be “attenuated” from the
arrest or search, nor will it be reckless, deliberate, or grossly negligent. The
Supreme Court has insisted, in numerous contexts, that the courts should
not probe the minds of police officers in order to determine the
reasonableness of police behavior.5 Herring seems to establish a test based
on “deliberate” or “reckless” conduct; this test has “sent courts rushing into
the minds of police officers.”6 Nor is it clear what “recklessness” means.
Was the Court adopting the narrow Model Penal Code standard of
“consciously disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk” of a Fourth
Amendment violation,7 which would be virtually impossible for defendants
to prove? Or was it establishing some lesser standard? Further, the Court
assumed that police recklessness could be deterred by exclusion but
negligence could or should not be. This is not obvious. Herring thus raised
many questions about the scope of the exclusionary rule that the Court was
redefining.8
In Davis v. United States,9 decided last Term, the Supreme Court
answered one of these questions as to one type of case and made it seem
1

555 U.S. 135 (2009).
Id. at 137.
3
Id. at 144.
4
Id. at 144–47.
5
See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions
play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).
6
Albert Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 463, 485 (2009).
7
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
8
See, e.g., Craig Bradley, Red Herring or the Death of the Exclusionary Rule, TRIAL
M AG., Apr. 2009, at 52.
9
131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
2

2012]

IS THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DEAD?

3

unlikely that Herring might be limited to its narrow holding. Davis held
that when police followed existing circuit precedent and searched a car
incident to arrest, the fact that the Supreme Court had subsequently
invalidated that precedent did not justify exclusion.10 This result seems
easy since the police were not even negligent in this case. However, to
what extent the exclusionary rule applies to various other kinds of scenarios
remains unclear.11 The post-Herring decisions of the courts of appeals
suggest that the exclusionary rule is not dead but has been significantly
limited by Herring.
This Article will examine Herring, its predecessor, Hudson v.
Michigan,12 the courts of appeals decisions interpreting them, and Davis in
an attempt to determine the current status of the exclusionary rule. The
Article proposes that “simple isolated negligence,” which Davis claims is
no basis for exclusion, should be distinguished from “substantial
negligence” in which the suspect’s privacy interests are seriously
compromised by police negligence. In the three cases decided so far, the
police negligence has either not interfered with a substantial right and been
attenuated from the finding of the evidence (Hudson), or the arresting
officers have acted entirely reasonably (Herring and Davis). Therefore we
do not yet know how the Court will react to a case in which (1) there is
police negligence, (2) that negligence substantially interferes with a
suspect’s privacy interests, as in an illegal arrest, a car search, or a
warrantless search of a home, and (3) the negligence is not “attenuated”
from the finding of the evidence. Thus, there is still some hope for the
exclusionary rule.
II. HERRING V. UNITED STATES AND HUDSON V. MICHIGAN
Although Herring is considered the main case on the status of the
exclusionary rule, its predecessor, Hudson v. Michigan,13 fired the first shot
of the current Court’s attack on the rule. In Hudson, police executing a
search warrant failed to knock and announce before entry, thus admittedly
violating a requirement of Fourth Amendment law.14 However, the Court,
per Justice Scalia, held that the exclusionary rule should only apply in cases

10

See id. at 2423–24.
Id. at 2434 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
12
547 U.S. 586 (2006).
13
Id. For a more detailed discussion of Hudson, see Albert Alschuler, The Exclusionary
Rule and Causation: Hudson v. Michigan and Its Ancestors, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1741 (2008),
and James Tomkovicz, Hudson v. Michigan and the Future of Fourth Amendment Exclusion,
93 IOWA L. REV. 1819 (2008).
14
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 588.
11

4

CRAIG M. BRADLEY

[Vol. 102

“where its deterrent benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.”15
In the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio, the Court declared: “We hold
that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”16 The
Hudson Court wrote off Mapp’s holding as “expansive dicta.”17 The Court
suggested that knock-and-announce violations could be dealt with by civil
suits, despite the fact that the suspect’s fifteen to twenty seconds of lost
privacy18 would be worth nothing in a civil suit. Thus, as a practical matter,
the Fourth Amendment’s knock-and-announce requirement was dead, since
police could violate it without consequence.
Further, the Court noted that evidence found after a knock-andannounce violation is not a result of that violation. Instead, the police
would have found the evidence anyway in the subsequent search; thus the
Court likened this case to the doctrines of inevitable discovery and
independent source that allow the admission of evidence despite a
violation.19 In other words, according to the Court, the finding of the
evidence was “attenuated” from the violation.20 The Court was not willing
to recognize that suspects can use that time to flush evidence down the
toilet or throw it into a fire.
The exact scope of Hudson was rendered unclear by the concurring
opinion of Justice Kennedy, who lent his crucial fifth vote to pertinent parts
of the majority opinion. But Justice Kennedy then declared that “the
continued operation of the exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our
precedents, is not in doubt. Today’s decision determines only that in the
specific context of the knock-and-announce requirement, a violation is not
sufficiently related to the later discovery of evidence to justify
suppression.”21 It is hard to imagine another Fourth Amendment violation
whose consequences are as minor as the fifteen to twenty seconds of
privacy lost when police fail to knock and announce during execution of a
search warrant. So it is fair to deem Hudson a unique case, important only
for what it says in dictum about the exclusionary rule, not for its holding.
Three years later, it was necessary for the Court to decide Herring to
try to solidify its new conception of the exclusionary rule, and to get a
15

Id. at 591 (internal quotation marks omitted).
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
17
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591.
18
This was the Court’s estimate in United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 40–41 (2003).
19
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592–93.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 603 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). However,
Justice Kennedy had joined that part of the opinion that limited the operation of the
exclusionary rule.
16
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majority to join the opinion without reservation. In Herring, police in one
county relied on another county’s report of an outstanding arrest warrant for
Herring. They arrested him, searched him incident to arrest, and found a
gun and drugs, which were the basis of the federal charges against him.
Shortly after the search, they discovered that the other county had made a
mistake and that there was no warrant outstanding for Herring.
Nevertheless, he was prosecuted. The trial judge refused to exclude the
evidence, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.22
In agreeing that the evidence found should not have been suppressed,
the Court, per the Chief Justice, reiterated Hudson’s unfounded statement
that “exclusion ‘has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.’”23
But this time it set forth a test for determining when evidence should not be
suppressed. As noted earlier, the Court held narrowly that “[h]ere the error
was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest. We hold
that in these circumstances the jury should not be barred from considering
all the evidence.”24
On the other hand, the Court suggested that the exclusionary rule
should only be employed “to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.”25 The
Court went on:
We do not suggest that all recordkeeping errors by the police are immune from the
exclusionary rule. In this case, however, the conduct at issue was not so objectively
culpable as to require exclusion. In Leon, we held that “the marginal or nonexistent
benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance
on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of
exclusion.” The same is true when evidence is obtained in objectively reasonable
26
reliance on a subsequently recalled warrant.

As Professor Albert Alschuler and I both pointed out,27 this case could
be read narrowly as holding that here, where the arresting officers and their
chain of command were in no way at fault, and where the error in the other
county was thus “attenuated” from the arrest, it made no sense to apply the
exclusionary rule because there was no culpable behavior by police to deter.
This reading, and the fact that Justice Kennedy joined this opinion, is
consistent with his statement in Hudson that he was not endorsing a
wholesale remodeling of the exclusionary rule.
A number of
commentators, including Professors Wayne LaFave and Orin Kerr, also
22
23
24
25
26
27

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 138–39 (2009).
Id. at 140 (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591).
Id. at 137.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 146 (citations omitted).
Alschuler, supra note 6; Bradley, supra note 8.
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suggested that given the narrowness of the “holding” language, Herring
itself was but a small extension of Arizona v. Evans,28 which had previously
held that evidence would not be excluded when police rely on a mistake in
the court system’s database.29 The error was that of someone other than the
arresting officers. But the commentators recognized that Herring boded ill
for the future of the rule.30
Herring could also be read broadly as definitely establishing the new
exclusionary formula discussed above, what Alschuler deems the “big
blast” view of Herring: that the defendant would have to prove
recklessness, or gross or systemic negligence, in each case in order to get
the evidence suppressed, whether the seizure was “attenuated” from the
violation or not.31 Alschuler asked why, if the big blast view is correct, the
Court bothered to use the “attenuated” qualifier at all.32 It would have been
clearer to say that negligence does not lead to exclusion in the holding.
Besides the lack of clarity as to whether Herring gutted the
exclusionary rule, the critical issue of what level of culpability by the police
leads to exclusion remains obscure. The Court sets forth its “deliberate or
reckless” standard and then insists that this is an “objective” standard, even
though it plainly calls for an examination of the culpability of the police and
thus is subjective.33 Then the Court set forth the “objectively reasonable”
standard of Leon as if it were the same thing. But the Leon test is very
different. It is, by definition, an objective standard that hinges on whether
“a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was
illegal.”34 This is a negligence standard—if police are negligent, evidence

28
Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO.
L.J. 1077, 1086 (2011); Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme
Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 777–
78 (2009). Professor Clancy also recognizes that Herring is unclear as to both the
objective/subjective issue, as well as the broadness of the holding. Thomas Clancy, The
Irrelevance of the Fourth Amendment in the Roberts Court, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 191, 203–
04.
29
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
30
LaFave, for instance, deemed Herring a “scary” decision because the Court’s analysis
“far outruns the holding” and the case “seem[s] to set the table for a more ominous holding
on some future occasion.” LaFave, supra note 28, at 770.
31
See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 472.
32
Id. at 475.
33
As Alschuler points out, “[e]ven if there can be such a thing as ‘objective good faith,’
there is no such thing as ‘objectively deliberate wrongdoing.’” Alschuler, supra note 6, at
485. Moreover, “the word reckless . . . is ambiguous” as to whether it is objective or
subjective. Id. at 486 (analyzing Supreme Court cases).
34
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009) (quoting United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984)).
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must be excluded.35
In addition to the issue of what level of police culpability gives rise to
exclusion, Herring left numerous other questions unresolved. Most
obviously, what happens if (as in most cases) the police are negligent in a
way that is not attenuated from the seizure? This issue now seems settled in
the government’s favor by dictum in Davis,36 though, as I will discuss, there
may be different types of negligence. Next, what happens if police follow
precedent that is later overruled? This is the issue resolved in Davis. Third,
what happens where there is no clear precedent, but the courts conclude that
the police judgment was wrong in determining the correct legal course of
action?37 Fourth, what happens when the police reach an erroneous
conclusion based on the facts, so that they mistakenly believe they have
probable cause to search a car or they have exigent circumstances to search
a house without a warrant? Fifth, what happens when the police exceed the
scope of their authority, such as by holding someone too long in a “stop”38
or searching beyond the limits of the search warrant?39 Sixth, what happens
when the police assume that a person’s consent is “voluntary” or that the
consenter had authority and then the court concludes otherwise?40 These
issues will be discussed later in this Article.
III. DAVIS V. UNITED STATES
41

In Davis, police in Greenville, Alabama, conducted a routine traffic
stop that eventually resulted in the arrests of the driver for driving while
intoxicated and Davis, the passenger, for giving a false name to police.
35

At another point the Court declared that the standard was whether the police officer
“had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was
unconstitutional . . . .” Id. at 143 (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348–49 (1987)).
The Court also quoted Judge Friendly saying that exclusion should be limited to “flagrant or
deliberate violation[s].” Id.
36
See infra text accompanying notes 64–65.
37
For example, in Kyllo v. United States, the Court held that warrantless use of a heat
sensor to detect heat emissions from a house violated the Fourth Amendment and excluded
evidence as a result. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
38
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), involved such a situation, and the Court
invalidated a consent to search the defendant’s luggage and excluded the evidence found
therein.
39
In Leon, the Court assumed “that the officers properly executed the warrant and
searched only those places and for those objects that it was reasonable to believe were
covered by the warrant.” 468 U.S. at 918 n.19. That is, if the police behaved
“unreasonably” in this regard, the evidence must be suppressed.
40
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990), held that a “reasonable” belief in the
consenter’s authority would be enough to validate the consent. Thus an “unreasonable”
belief would lead to exclusion.
41
131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
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After the arrestees were handcuffed and placed in the back of patrol cars,
police searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle and found a
revolver inside Davis’s jacket pocket. Davis was arrested and convicted of
being a felon in possession of a firearm.42
It is undisputed that the suspicionless search of the car incident to the
arrest kept with Eleventh Circuit precedent,43 which was in turn based upon
the Supreme Court’s decision in New York v. Belton.44 However,
subsequent to Davis’s arrest, Belton was essentially overruled by Arizona v.
Gant.45 Gant required that, before police could search a car incident to
arrest when the suspects are under their control, they must have reason to
believe that evidence of the crime for which the defendant was arrested will
be found in the car.46 Such “reason to believe” was not present in Davis.47
Thus, the issue was whether evidence should be excluded when police
follow existing law that is subsequently overruled. A seven-to-two majority
concluded that it should not.48 Davis involves none of the mental states
discussed in Herring as appropriate for evidentiary exclusion. The police
did not deliberately violate Fourth Amendment law, nor were they reckless.
In fact, they were not even negligent. They were simply following the law.
Thus the issue of “attenuation” does not arise in this case. Rather, this case
is resolved by reference to Leon: the police acted in “objectively reasonable
reliance” on a case later held invalid, just as the police in Leon had relied on
a warrant later held invalid.49
Davis, written by Justice Alito, reiterates that Leon’s “good faith” test,
which most of the courts of appeal post-Herring have used, is appropriate:
The basic insight of the Leon line of cases is that the deterrence benefits of exclusion
“var[y] with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct” at issue. When the
police exhibit “deliberate,” “reckless,” or “grossly negligent” disregard for Fourth
Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh
the resulting costs. But when the police act with an objectively “reasonable goodfaith belief” that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct involves only simple,
“isolated” negligence, the “deterrence rationale loses much of its force,” and
50
exclusion cannot “pay its way.”

Thus, Davis declares that the exclusionary rule does not apply if either

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id. at 2425.
See United States v. Gonzales, 71 F.3d 819, 827–32 (11th Cir. 1996).
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
Id. at 1719.
See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426.
Id. at 2429.
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427.
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427–28 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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the police behaved as reasonably well-trained officers or they only
committed “simple, isolated negligence.”51 But these are not the same tests.
The Leon test is objective, and the “reasonable officer” by definition is not
negligent. The “simple, isolated negligence” part of the test goes beyond
the holding of Herring and Leon but is again dictum, since the police in
Davis could not reasonably be considered even negligent. Following this
paragraph the Court repeatedly refers to this as the “good faith exception”
drawn directly from Leon.52
Why should negligence not be sufficient? In Herring, the Court
conceded Justice Ginsburg’s claim that “liability for negligence . . . creates
an incentive to act with greater care” and said it did “not suggest that the
exclusion of evidence could have no deterrent effect.”53 Rather, it found
that for Herring’s facts “exclusion is not worth the cost.”54 In Davis the
Court exceeded Herring’s limited holding to state that “simple isolated
negligence” is not enough to justify exclusion, even though it had conceded
in Herring that negligence could be deterred.55
The other problem with the Davis formulation is the Court’s belief that
recklessness is more deterrable than negligence. A reckless policeman
knows that he may be violating the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights
but doesn’t care. It seems that such a person is less likely to be deterred by
the threat of exclusion than a simply careless policeman is, even though the
Court conceded in Herring that such a policeman could be deterred. The
reckless policeman is more culpable, but not necessarily more deterrable,
contrary to the Court’s stated belief: “The basic insight of the Leon line of
cases is that the deterrence benefits of exclusion ‘var[y] with the culpability
of the law enforcement conduct’ at issue.”56
But that is not the lesson of the Leon line of cases. The point of Leon
is that if someone else, like the magistrate or the legislature has made a
mistake, and the police simply act on that mistake in good faith, there is no
bad police conduct to deter.57 The police were simply doing their job.
Likewise, if the police are simply following a case that is later overruled as
in Davis, they have done nothing wrong; they have followed the law as it
51

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2428.
53
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 n.4 (2009).
54
Id.
55
Although Justice Alito, the author of Davis, was clearly doing this to eliminate any
sense of confusion from Herring as to whether negligence was sufficient for exclusion, and
thus was speaking for the conservative majority, he may have slipped this one by Justices
Kagan and Sotomayor, who joined the whole opinion.
56
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 143).
57
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920–21 (1984).
52
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existed at the time they acted. That does not suggest that, when the police
are guilty of culpable conduct, they are more deterrable the more culpable
that conduct becomes.
These terms of culpability are insufficient to capture a range of police
behavior, some of which should lead to exclusion and some not. Suppose
that police fail to, or inadequately, fill in the “things to be searched for” box
on a search warrant, but never use that error to unacceptably expand the
scope of the search.
This is clearly negligence, but minor and
inconsequential and should not lead to exclusion.58 On the other hand, if
police, lacking probable cause to arrest someone, negligently conclude that
they have it, they are not acting as “reasonably well-trained” police officers;
their error is not attenuated from the subsequent search, and any evidence
found should be excluded.59 The defendant’s rights have been violated in a
much more significant fashion than in the “particularity” mistake or the
knock-and-announce violation in Hudson. Thus, it is possible that the
Court’s reference to “simple, isolated negligence” only includes minor
mistakes that don’t affect suspects very much. This factor should be the
key!
Police culpability, which, according to the Court, is the main issue,60
should vary according to the impact of police negligence on the suspect. It
is obviously less culpable to mistakenly fill in a box on a search warrant
without disadvantaging the suspect than it is to negligently conclude that a
suspect is subject to arrest, search him, book him, and leave him in jail until
he is arraigned the next day when, perhaps, his attorney can straighten
things out. Likewise, a negligent assessment that exigent circumstances are
present so that the police can dispense with a search warrant in searching
someone’s house is more culpable than failing to knock and announce when
executing a search warrant.61 If we’re going to assess police culpability on
a case-by-case basis, as Herring requires, we should at least take into
account the extent of the intrusion on privacy that negligent police behavior
causes.
That culpability depends in part on the impact on the victim is a
commonplace in criminal law. Murderers are punished much more severely
than attempted murderers, even though they commit the same act with the
58

See infra text accompanying notes 99–114 (discussing Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551
(2004)).
59
For further discussion of this issue, see infra Part IV and text accompanying notes 85–
100.
60
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (“The basic insight of the Leon line of cases is that the
deterrence benefits of exclusion var[y] with the culpability of the [police].” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009))).
61
See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
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same mens rea.62 Likewise manslaughter is punished more severely than
reckless endangerment, as is theft of a purse when the amount inside
happens to exceed the statutory limit for grand larceny.
Lest the Court has forgotten, the Fourth Amendment itself forbids
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” In my view the Fourth Amendment
and the exclusionary rule should be co-extensive. If a search is
“unreasonable” (i.e., negligent), then it violates the Fourth Amendment and
the evidence should be excluded. If it violates some Fourth Amendmentbased rule that the Court has developed over the years, such as the knockand-announce requirement, but is not unreasonable, then the evidence
should not be excluded.63
Likewise, non-negligent reliance on
contemporaneously valid case law should not lead to exclusion. I do not
object to a “simple isolated negligence” exception if it is meant to refer to
minor breaches that do not substantially interfere with a suspect’s rights, as
opposed to illegal arrests with all their consequences or searches of houses
incorrectly based on exigent circumstances.
The Davis Court’s discussion of whether or not “negligence” is
enough to invoke the exclusionary rule is therefore dictum, as it was in
Herring. As suggested above, it may be that the “simple isolated
negligence” mentioned in Davis—a case in which there was no negligence
at all—was not meant to apply to cases of what we might call “substantial
negligence,” where police negligently interfere significantly with a
suspect’s rights. Or at least Justice Kennedy, consistent with his concurring
opinion in Hudson, may feel this way.
Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment in Davis, pointing out
that “[t]his case does not present the markedly different question whether
the exclusionary rule applies when the law governing the constitutionality
of a particular search is unsettled.”64 Nor does it necessarily resolve the
other scenarios, mentioned above, that Herring left unsettled.
However, as Justice Breyer pointed out in dissent:
[A]n officer who conducts a search that he believes complies with the Constitution but
which, it ultimately turns out, falls just outside the Fourth Amendment’s bounds is no
more culpable than an officer who follows erroneous “binding precedent.” Nor is an
officer more culpable where circuit precedent is simply suggestive rather than
“binding,” where it only describes how to treat roughly analogous instances, or where
it just does not exist. Thus, if the Court means what it now says, if it would place
determinative weight upon the culpability of an individual officer’s conduct, and if it

62
Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1985) (murder is a first-degree felony), with
§ 5.05 (attempted murder is a second-degree crime).
63
This argument is set forth in detail in Craig Bradley, Reconceiving the Fourth
Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2010, at 211.
64
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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would apply the exclusionary rule only where a Fourth Amendment violation was
“deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent,” then the “good faith” exception will
65
swallow the exclusionary rule.

Hudson, Herring, and now Davis suggest that Justice Breyer may be
right as to the situations he discusses. Hudson involved police misbehavior
that was at least negligent, and possibly reckless or systemic, in that it
blatantly violated Supreme Court precedent. But the Court in that case
refused to exclude the evidence because the Fourth Amendment right at
issue was too minor and the violation was too “attenuated” from the finding
of the evidence, which would have been found anyway without the police
violation. By contrast, in Herring and Davis, the conduct of the arresting
police was blameless.
There is still a large category of cases where the police conduct is
clearly wrong, but does not amount to “substantial negligence” as I have
defined it. Thus, searches that the officer reasonably believes are legal but
that fall “just outside the Fourth Amendment’s bounds” or follow
“suggestive rather than ‘binding’ precedent” are not really negligent acts
that a “reasonably well-trained officer” would not undertake. In my view,
these should not lead to exclusion. But searches involving a clear
miscalculation of probable cause, exigent circumstances, or consent, while
perhaps not reckless, are not the sort of searches that a well-trained officer
undertakes. Those searches should lead to exclusion if they substantially
intrude on the suspect’s privacy interests. Or the Court could just declare
such searches “reckless,” a term they have not yet defined.66 We should not
try to force courts to distinguish between reckless and negligent police
behavior in making the exclusionary decision. Negligence (or recklessness)
plus significant intrusion on the suspect’s privacy rights is enough to justify
suppression.
A. RETROACTIVITY

There are two other issues considered in Davis, though unrelated to the
theme of this Article, that should be discussed. The reader who is not
interested in these points could skip this discussion without losing the flow
of the Article.
The first is retroactivity. While Davis was pending on appeal, the
Court decided Gant and upended Belton. The petitioner and dissent argued
65

Id. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 276 (1971) (“The mental element of
‘knowing or reckless disregard’ required under the New York Times test, for example, is not
always easy of ascertainment. ‘Inevitably its outer limits will be marked out through caseby-case adjudication . . . .’” (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730–31
(1968))).
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that Gant should apply in Davis, according to established retroactivity
precedent, Griffith v. Kentucky.67 The Court conceded that Gant applies
here and that therefore the police violated the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights.68 But “[r]etroactive application does not, however,
determine what ‘appropriate remedy’ (if any) the defendant should
obtain.”69 In Davis, the Court denied exclusionary relief. To one not
steeped in the mysteries of retroactivity doctrine, this sounds reasonable.
B. STUNTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW

The other issue is whether the difficulty of obtaining a remedy for
Fourth Amendment violations will “stunt the development of Fourth
Amendment law,” as the petitioner argued.70 On this view, “[w]ith no
possibility of suppression, criminal defendants will have no incentive . . . to
request that courts overrule precedent.”71 Professors Alschuler and Kerr
have also expressed concerns about this issue.72
The Court begins by disingenuously asserting that “this argument
applies to an exceedingly small set of cases. Decisions overruling this
Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents are rare,”73 this not having happened
since 1967 when Chimel v. California74 overruled United States v.
Rabinowitz75 and Harris v. United States.76 While this may be technically
true, it overlooks Gant, which Justice Alito himself described as overruling
Belton v. New York,77 and Herring, which effectively overruled a key part
of Mapp v. Ohio78 by deeming its holding “expansive dicta.” Nevertheless,
the majority correctly notes that “as a practical matter, defense counsel in
many cases will test this Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents in the same
way that Belton was tested in Gant—by arguing that the precedent is
distinguishable.”79
Also, if a court of appeals has binding precedent on which police rely,
67

479 U.S. 314 (1987).
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2431.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 2432.
71
Id.
72
Alschuler, supra note 6, at 489–90; Kerr, supra note 28, at 1092.
73
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2433.
74
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
75
339 U.S. 56 (1950).
76
331 U.S. 145 (1947).
77
453 U.S. 454 (1981). It’s true that in Gant the Court didn’t overrule Belton, but just
confined it to its narrow facts. However, Justice Alito repeats his characterization of Gant as
overruling Belton in Davis. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2425.
78
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2433.
68

14

CRAIG M. BRADLEY

[Vol. 102

the Supreme Court can take a case from another circuit, or state, that
disagrees.80 Finally, as will be discussed, the courts of appeals are not shy
about declaring that certain police practices violate the Fourth Amendment,
even if they then refuse to exclude the evidence under Herring.
Consequently, in the next case, the police will not be able to claim that they
acted in good faith because circuit precedent is now clearly against them.
Suppose the Supreme Court has decided that it wants to overrule
Chimel v. California81 in light of Arizona v. Gant, as the Gant dissenters
predicted they might.82 That is, instead of allowing suspicionless searches
incident to arrest of the area within the immediate control of an arrestee in a
dwelling, a majority of the Court would like to impose the Gant
requirement of “reason to believe” that evidence of the crime of arrest will
be found. However, based on Davis, no court of appeals will suppress
evidence because the police relied on the then-existing precedent of Chimel.
But this would not stop a court of appeals, after reading Gant, from
concluding that the suspicionless search of a house was unconstitutional
under the Supreme Court’s new view of searches incident to arrest.83 Thus
the validity of a suspicionless search incident to an arrest would be
presented to the Supreme Court. Or, even if the lower courts did not feel it
right to depart from Chimel, the Supreme Court itself could do so while
refusing to suppress the evidence in this case, as the Court suggests in
Davis.84
IV. THE COURTS OF APPEALS CASES
Meanwhile, the courts of appeals, while in disagreement on a number
of post-Herring issues, were, unlike the commentators, untroubled by what
the appropriate test was after Herring.85 They uniformly ignored the
“attenuated” language of Herring86 and instead treated that case as simply
extending Leon’s “good faith exception” to non-warrant cases.87 In large
part, no doubt, this treatment occurred because no case presented to the
courts of appeals seemed to present an “attenuation” issue. As noted, this
80

Id.
395 U.S. 792 (1969).
82
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1731 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“If we are going
to reexamine Belton, we should also reexamine . . . Chimel . . . .”).
83
As did the Third Circuit in United States v. Shakir, 616 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2010)
(involving the suspicionless search of a gym bag incident to arrest).
84
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2433.
85
This is based on a study of all cases in the courts of appeals citing Herring.
86
The courts ignored it in the sense of not basing their decisions on “attenuation.”
87
See, e.g., United States v. Koch, 625 F.3d 470, 477–78 (8th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Song Ja Cha, 597 F.3d 995, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Leon-based approach was invited by the Court in Herring and subsequently
endorsed in Davis.88 Most importantly, the courts of appeals did not
conclude that the exclusionary rule was effectively dead, yet. Instead, a
number of courts held that evidence must still be suppressed following
Herring.
The most common post-Herring cases in the courts of appeals did not
really involve a Herring issue at all. Rather, they involved police utilizing a
defective search warrant and the courts uniformly ruling that under Leon, as
well as Herring, the evidence should not be suppressed because the police
acted in good faith when relying on the warrant.89
It should be noted, however, that just because a case involves a
warrant does not necessarily exempt all evidence from exclusion. Leon set
forth at least five situations in which evidence would be excluded despite
the existence of a warrant. The Third Circuit summarized four situations:
(1) where the magistrate relied on an affidavit that was deliberately or
recklessly false, (2) where the magistrate was not neutral and detached, (3)
where the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no
reasonable officer could rely on it, and (4) when the warrant failed on its
face to list the things to be seized or the person or the place to be searched.90
To this a fifth situation should be added: when the police unreasonably
exceeded the scope of the warrant—another negligence standard.91
Despite the existence of a warrant, a defendant recently won an
exclusion victory in a court of appeals in United States v. Song Ja Cha.92 In
this case, Guam police responding to a complaint heard a separate claim
that women were being prostituted against their will in a karaoke bar. They
went to the bar and attached residence and found women who made this
claim. The police inspected the bar and the house and obtained undisputed
probable cause to believe that these allegations were true.93 They then
seized the house and bar, excluded all occupants, and pursued a search
warrant. However, they were “nonchalant”94 in this pursuit and didn’t
88

Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428.
E.g., United States v. Campbell, 603 F.3d 1218, 1225–26 (10th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 150–54 (3d Cir. 2010).
90
Tracey, 597 F.3d at 151. It could be argued that a magistrate’s abandonment of his
judicial role is not a mistake for which the police should be held responsible, but Leon
declared that “in such circumstances, no reasonably well trained officer should rely on the
warrant.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984).
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See Leon, 468 U.S. at 918 n.19 (“Our discussion . . . assumes . . . that the officers
properly executed the warrant and searched only those places and for those objects that it
was reasonable to believe were covered by the warrant.”).
92
Song Ja Cha, 597 F.3d at 1004–07.
93
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Id. at 1006.
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return with the warrant until 26.5 hours later, having kept everyone out of
the house in the interim, despite the owner’s need to get his medicine for
diabetes.95 The Ninth Circuit deemed this conduct “deliberate, culpable,
and systemic”96 and affirmed the suppression of evidence seized, consistent
with Herring.97
Another issue, which had created a conflict in the circuits, was
whether, when the police conduct a search incident to arrest of an
automobile consistently with Belton v. New York, the evidence should be
suppressed because of the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Arizona
v. Gant.98 Gant held that suspicionless searches of automobiles incident to
arrest were generally no longer allowed, contrary to Belton. Davis resolved
this conflict by holding that pre-Gant searches conducted by police under
the authority of Belton should not result in evidentiary suppression.
Another conflict over the exclusion issue that I suspect is the next one
that will be resolved by the Supreme Court is this: Should evidence be
excluded if the police fail to meet the particularity requirement in a search
warrant? Groh v. Ramirez99 seemed to make it clear that the Leon good
faith exception would not apply in a case where the police neglected to fill
in the portion of the search warrant in which they were to specify the items
to be seized100 or failed to refer to the attached affidavit in this respect.
Although Groh was a civil case, it made it clear that the Leon “good faith
exception” was the same when the issue was qualified immunity rather than
exclusion.101 Groh held that “no reasonable officer” could execute such a
fatally defective warrant,102 despite the fact that the officers did not expand
the search beyond what they would have sought had the “description”
section been filled in properly.103
In United States v. Lazar,104 the Sixth Circuit dealt with a case in
which police seized the records of various hospital patients, some of whose
names were not mentioned in the warrant. The court held that Groh v.
95

Id. at 998–99.
Id. at 1004. I’m not sure why the Ninth Circuit termed this “systemic.”
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Id. at 1007.
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129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). Compare United States v. Buford, 632 F.3d 264, 270–77 (6th
Cir. 2011) (holding that the evidence should not be suppressed under Herring and noting that
three other circuits had resolved the case the same way), with United States v. Gonzalez, 578
F.3d, 1130, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2009) (suppressing the evidence).
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540 U.S. 551 (2004).
100
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Id. at 564.
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Id. at 561.
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604 F.3d 230 (6th Cir. 2010).
96

2012]

IS THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DEAD?

17

Ramirez governed, rather than the “less on point” case of Herring.105
“Herring does not purport to alter that aspect of the exclusionary rule which
applies to warrants that are facially deficient warrants ab initio.”106
Consequently, the evidence regarding those patients must be excluded.
Note that this case, in which the police searched the records of people not
named in the warrant, could be termed “substantial negligence” under my
earlier analysis and hence lead to exclusion even under Davis. The
situation differs from Groh, where the agents did not exceed the bounds of
the allowed search because of their mistake.
In United States v. Rosa,107 the Second Circuit dealt with a warrant for
computers in a child porn case that did not specify the crime for which the
police were searching. Thus, on its face, the warrant would allow a search
of tax records or other unrelated information.108 However, the police did
not search further than for child pornography.109 The court held that this
warrant violated the Fourth Amendment, but that, under Herring, the
evidence should not be suppressed. It found that this was isolated
negligence and that this warrant did not suffer from the “glaring
deficiencies” of the warrant in Groh.110
Similarly, in United States v. Otero,111 the Tenth Circuit dealt with a
warrant to search a postal employee’s computer for evidence of postal
crimes. The warrant did not specify the crimes for which evidence was
sought and was thus overbroad.112 However, the court (without discussing
Groh) declined to suppress the evidence under Herring on the ground that
the authorities had in fact limited the search to the suspected crimes and
believed that the warrant was so limited.113 Thus, they lacked “knowledge
. . . that the search was unconstitutional” under Herring.114 According to
my analysis, the police were clearly negligent, but since they did not take
advantage of their mistake, the negligence was not substantial. However,
had they exceeded the scope of their probable cause and searched for
evidence of crimes for which they lacked probable cause, I would conclude
that this was not “simple isolated negligence” but “substantial negligence”
105

Id. at 236.
Id. at 237–38.
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626 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2010).
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Id.
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563 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2009).
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Id. at 1132.
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Id. at 1134, 1136.
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Id. at 1134 (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348–49 (1987)). Cf. United States
v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830 (5th Cir. 2010).
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and suppress any additional evidence found (but not evidence of the postal
crimes).
Despite Groh’s lack of sympathy when the police limited their search
to what it would have been had the warrant been specific, I think this limit
will be the deciding factor in these cases. When the police make, but do not
take advantage of, these kinds of clerical errors, they are obviously acting
negligently, not recklessly or knowledgeably, as to Fourth Amendment
rights. This is “simple isolated negligence.” If the Supreme Court takes up
this issue, it will either overrule Groh outright, or limit it to the kind of
glaring deficiency present in that case. Since Justice Alito has replaced
Justice O’Connor, the author of the five-to-four decision in Groh, Groh is a
dead Herring.
Another case involving a search warrant in which the defendant
prevailed is United States v. Brown.115 In Brown, the FBI was investigating
a masked bank robbery. Having found the mask, the FBI was seeking a
search warrant to test Brown’s DNA to compare it to DNA on the mask. In
preparing the affidavit for the search warrant, an agent not directly involved
in the investigation made a false declaration that tied the defendant directly
to the bank robbery and was critical to probable cause. The district court
found that this statement was made with “reckless disregard for the
truth,”116 despite the fact that the affiant believed the statement.117
Accordingly, the evidence was suppressed. But this action would likely not
be “reckless” under the narrow Model Penal Code definition, since the
agent was apparently not “consciously disregard[ing] a substantial . . .
risk”118 that he was violating the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights. But
this was at least “substantial negligence.” This is the sort of case where
even after Davis, evidence should be suppressed.
A final post-Herring case deserves discussion, though it is from the
New Jersey Supreme Court rather than a federal court of appeals. In State
v. Handy,119 police stopped a man for bicycling on the sidewalk in violation
of a city ordinance. The officer did a warrant check with the police
dispatcher, submitting the man’s name, “Germaine” Handy, which he
spelled out, address in Millville, New Jersey, and date of birth. The
dispatcher confirmed that there was an arrest warrant outstanding for
Handy, and pursuant to this information Handy was arrested and cocaine
was found.120
115
116
117
118
119
120

631 F.3d 638 (3d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 641, 648–49.
Id. at 649–50.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
18 A.3d 179 (N.J. 2011).
Id. at 180–81.
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It turned out that the information that the dispatcher had in hand
showed a ten-year-old arrest warrant for a man named “Jermaine” Handy
with a different date of birth and an address in Los Angeles. When the
arresting officer found this out at the station, he only arrested Handy for the
cocaine found in the search, not the crime named in the supposed arrest
warrant. The dispatcher was aware of these discrepancies, but failed to call
them to the arresting officer’s attention.121
The Court found that Herring was inapplicable because the police
dispatcher was not “attenuated” from the arrest “but was literally a cooperative in its effectuation” and that her conduct was “objectively
unreasonable.”122 Accordingly, this kind of behavior could be deterred by
exclusion and that was the appropriate remedy.123 The police behavior also
led to a substantial incursion into a suspect’s rights. In fact, even if this had
been a dispatcher from another county, as in Herring, the dispatcher’s
culpability should have rendered “attenuation” irrelevant.
Several observations can be made about the post-Herring cases. The
first, unrelated to the subject of this Article, is how many involve search
warrants. This is encouraging, suggesting that police are regularly getting
them. However, Herring has now removed the incentive—more lenient
treatment of the exclusionary issue—for police to get warrants. This
removal may cause warrant use to decline.
Second is the application of Leon’s “reasonably well-trained officer”
standard, which is, as noted, a negligence standard. The standard may be
altered slightly now that Davis has rejected “simple isolated negligence” as
a basis for exclusion. Still, the courts are not suggesting that there is any
burden of proof on the defendant on this issue. If the police make a
mistake, the courts simply ask, “is this the sort of mistake that a reasonably
well-trained officer would make?” This inquiry has led to exclusion in a
number of the cases discussed. Thus the exclusionary rule is not dead.
Third, most cases decide the Fourth Amendment issue first, and then
decide the Herring issue. This means that in the next case, at least as to
mistakes of law, when the police have lost before on the Fourth
Amendment issue, they cannot claim “good faith” if they commit the same
mistake again.
V. OTHER ISSUES LEFT OPEN BY HERRING AND DAVIS
Justice Sotomayor argues that the following issue is still unsettled after
121
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Davis:124 What if the police are acting in a new area that is not governed by
existing law? It will be difficult to find that the police were acting
negligently in such a situation, as Justice Breyer suggests.125
In Kyllo v. United States, the police beamed a “thermal imager” at a
house to determine if it was emitting unusual amounts of heat, and upon
finding that it was, used this information to get a search warrant based on
probable cause of indoor marijuana growing.126 The Supreme Court held
five to four that use of the thermal imager was an unreasonable intrusion
into the home.127 If this case were arising for the first time today,
presumably a district court could conclude that this did indeed violate the
Fourth Amendment, but that, under Herring, the police mistake did not
warrant exclusion, as the police were not reckless or even negligent in their
application of existing law, which was unclear as to this issue. Contrary to
Justice Sotomayor’s view, whether or not a police officer’s conduct can be
characterized as culpable is dispositive.128 Whether or not this was a
substantial intrusion into the suspect’s privacy is irrelevant to the question
of exclusion, because there was no police negligence in the first place.
But since the Supreme Court has actually held that this police practice
is not allowed, in the next case the police can no longer claim that they were
acting in good faith, and the evidence must be excluded. Thus, there can be
no warrantless, good-faith use of thermal imagers after Kyllo or in any case
where circuit precedent is established.
What about mistakes by the police in assessing facts? Suppose the
police search a car with what they believe is probable cause, but the trial
court concludes that they lacked it. This is a particularly troubling case.
It’s one thing to rely on a magistrate’s judgment that there is probable cause
supporting a search warrant, as in Leon. At least a judicial officer has
intervened in the case. But here, the police are simply relying on their own
judgment and seriously interfering with the suspect’s rights. It is possible
that the Court would reassert its “attenuation” analysis from Herring in this
situation and hold that such a non-attenuated violation of the Fourth
Amendment requires exclusion.
Or it could call this “substantial
negligence,” as opposed to the “simple isolated negligence” rejected as a
124
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basis of exclusion in Davis. Either way, a negligent assessment of probable
cause leading to the substantial intrusion of a car search or an arrest should
be the basis of exclusion.
A similar analysis would occur if the police were mistaken about a
fact, such as the address that they put in a search warrant. If the factual
error was found to be due to police negligence, obviously the harm to the
innocent victim of the mistake would be substantial, and any evidence
found in his house should be suppressed.129
Exceeding the scope of a warrant gives rise to similar analysis.
Suppose the police have a search warrant for stolen widescreen television
sets and, during its execution, look in drawers or other places where a
television could not be and find drugs. This strikes me as a substantial
intrusion into the suspect’s privacy and, if the police are negligent, as they
would usually be in exceeding the written terms of the warrant, the
evidence should be excluded. Surely the Court does not want such
misbehavior to go unpunished, though they could also order exclusion by
deeming this behavior “reckless.”
Another issue is consent searches. Suppose the police search a house
based on consent, and the court later concludes that the defendant did not
consent or that the consent was involuntary. Should the evidence be
excluded automatically, or must the defendant still pass the Herring test to
have the evidence excluded? Consent is somewhat different than other
Fourth Amendment issues. The validity of a consent is not based on the
voluntariness of this particular defendant, but rather on whether a
“reasonable [innocent] person would [have felt] free to decline the officers’
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.”130
Thus, in finding consent invalid, the court has already determined, in a
sense,131 that the police behaved unreasonably by misjudging what a
“reasonable person” would do. It would not be right then to conclude that a
reasonably well-trained officer would have made this mistake.132 Similarly,
129

Cf. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987) (upholding the search of the wrong
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if the police wrongly conclude that a particular individual has the authority
to consent to a search, that wrongful conclusion has already violated the test
of Illinois v. Rodriguez.133 Rodriguez requires that “the facts available to
the officer . . . warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the
consenting party had authority over the premises.”134 Thus the police have
already failed the “reasonable officer” test and shouldn’t get to relitigate it
again with a Herring argument.
In sum, although the Court in Davis edges even closer to effectively
abolishing the exclusionary rule except in really extreme cases, it hasn’t
done so yet. In neither Herring nor Davis could the police behavior even be
termed negligent, much less anything worse. We are still waiting for a case
where the police have made a negligent mistake that substantially interferes
with a suspect’s constitutional rights, such as an arrest not based on
probable cause or a warrantless search of a house where police evaluation
of exigent circumstances is clearly wrong.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have long been a supporter of the mandatory exclusionary rule. If the
police violate the suspect’s rights, the evidence should be excluded without
further ado. As a former prosecutor I did not find that the rule exacted a
high price on law enforcement, as the Supreme Court now claims. It was
rare for exclusionary claims to succeed, and when they did, the police
deserved it. Thus the courts were not, as a general rule, excluding evidence
based on minor, technical violations of the Fourth Amendment.
However, it was I who discovered, and brought to the Supreme Court’s
attention, the fact that “the automatic exclusionary rule applied in our courts
is . . . ‘universally rejected’ by other countries.”135 Realizing that perfectly
civilized countries like England, Canada, and Germany don’t automatically
apply the exclusionary rule to all search and seizure violations, but rather do
so on a discretionary basis when the “ends of justice” demand it (or some
similar language), does give one pause about the need for a mandatory rule.
Therefore, I don’t necessarily criticize the Court’s attempt to limit the scope
of the rule.
But so far, the Justices have enunciated neither a clear nor a fair
police were trying to rely on their own mistake in concluding that the handcuffing was
justified, rather than on a computer mistake as in Herring. Id., cited with approval in United
States v. Barclay, No. 2:10-CR-20570, 2011 WL 1595065 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2011).
133
497 U.S. 177 (1990).
134
Id. at 188 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–
22 (1968)).
135
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 344 (2006) (quoting Craig Bradley, Mapp
Goes Abroad, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 399–400 (2001)).
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alternative rule. They are unclear about whether their rule is an objective
one based on the behavior of a hypothetical “reasonable policeman” or a
subjective one based on the culpability of the officers in the case. They are
unclear about just what level of culpability by the police will justify
exclusion and who bears the burden of proof. And they misconceive the
connection between police culpability and deterrence of future police
misconduct by assuming that “punishing” reckless officers with exclusion
will deter police misconduct more than punishing negligent ones will.
To the extent the Court endorses the “reasonable good faith” objective
negligence approach of Leon and simply extends it to warrantless searches,
I don’t necessarily disagree with it. In short, despite the loose talk in these
cases about severely limiting the exclusionary rule, I don’t disagree with the
outcomes in Hudson, Herring, or Davis. The police in Hudson, though
negligent or worse, did not interfere substantially with the suspect’s privacy
rights. And the police conduct in Herring and Davis was completely
reasonable.
But when the police, through negligence or recklessness, substantially
interfere with a suspect’s privacy rights and in the process obtain evidence
to which they would not otherwise have access, that evidence should be
suppressed. It is simple justice that the evidence be excluded.
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